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With societies around the world tackling the Coronavirus pandemic, the role of digital 
technology has come into focus as a means of augmenting efforts to manage disease 
and its impacts. What can apps, big data, and digital analytics contribute to such ef-
forts, and what risks do they pose? 
Asia provides important lessons. Not only have societies in the region long been at the 
forefront of technological development, but they have also proactively adopted digital 
solutions as they confront COVID-19. Importantly, Asia has a history of managing 
highly contagious diseases, and outbreaks like SARS in 2002 or H1N1 in 2009 have 
provided experiences in risk management and health provision that now powerfully 
inform both digital and non-digital responses to the current pandemic. The result is a 
diverse range of different approaches that can teach us much about the advantages 
and disadvantages of designing tech solutions to fight pandemics. 
The Leiden Asia Centre (LAC) has asked social science and area studies researchers 
knowledgeable about tech developments in Asia to survey current practices and re-
sults in five different settings: mainland China, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, and Tai-
wan. This preliminary report makes the most important results available to policymak-
ers in a short, accessible format.*  
In what follows, we provide an overview of app-based approaches in each setting. Our 
study shows how technology and its uses are never neutral. They instead heavily de-
pend on the decisions that stakeholders make in specific contexts. The following are 
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1. Tech is embedded in society: apps and other digital solutions are only ever as 
effective as the measures ‘on the ground’. They do not exist in a vacuum; instead, they 
flank, augment, and amplify policy decisions in ways that are highly contingent on 
broader societal efforts. Across Asia, digital solutions interact with generally high-qual-
ity healthcare systems, strong border controls, strict social distancing measures, ag-
gressive testing and re-testing, pro-active tracking, and a widespread use of masks 
and disinfectants throughout society. Any digital measures have to be understood in 
those contexts. 
2. Tech is political: digital tools are designed by someone, for someone, and for spe-
cific purposes. They reflect the experiences and assumptions of designers and of the 
people commissioning such apps. This means that they can contain biases, sometimes 
invisibly so. 
3. Tech relies on data: digital tools are only ever as good as the data they use. Gar-
bage in, garbage out. If data is incomplete, or compromised, or unreliable, then so is 
the app. The result can be highly detrimental, leading to a false sense of security, pol-
icies that target the wrong issues, or discrimination of vulnerable groups. 
4. Tech solutions require choices: governing a pandemic requires trade-offs, and this 
is also true for digital responses. In the case of apps, a prominent trade-off is between 
efficiency and privacy/freedom. Societal and political actors who wish to enhance their 
governance through apps will have to make choices on how to balance this trade-off; 
there is no single best-practice solution to this dilemma.  
5. Tech is ‘sticky’: technological solutions are powerful because they can quickly, and 
seemingly comprehensively, shape behaviours, establish new habits, and form specific 
practices. They become institutions, and this means they can become ‘entrenched’ and 






* The work presented here is based on a first round of desk-research, and it omits detailed references in the interest 
of brevity. More detailed and fully-sourced studies will follow: in late April, the LAC will publish the full regional 
surveys on its website; at a later stage, it will publish an in-depth report that will incorporate detailed policy anal-
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Failing to adjust to new developments 
in the pandemic, a lack of information 
and impediments in structures of gov-
ernance have undermined Japanese ef-
forts to contain the spread of the virus, 
despite the implementation of several 
risk management strategies. The gov-
ernment has employed public surveys 
for data collection, using an existing 
and widely used application, LINE, in 
order to get a grasp on the magnitude 
of the spread. However, the Japanese 
case also highlights how apps are only 
effective if they are part of a concerted 
general effort to counter the disease. 
The current failure to contain the virus 
will have significant effects on 
healthcare, public trust, and the na-
tional economy. 
 
To understand the limitations of Ja-
pan’s app usage to combat COVID-19, 
it is important to highlight several im-
pacts that Japan’s current trajectory in 
crisis management has had more gen-
erally: 
 The decentralised nature of gov-
ernance and constitutional limi-
tations have delayed the na-
tional strategy for containment. 
 A failure to respond adequately 
to this pandemic continues to ex-
acerbate problems with an al-
ready collapsing health care in-
frastructure. 
 The perceived failures of the cur-
rent administration have heavily 
eroded public trust in the gov-
ernment’s capability to handle 
future pandemics. 
 The failure to adapt is lengthen-
ing the negative impact on the 
national economy. 
The main objective of the first stage of 
the national COVID-19 response was to 
contain the spread via a cluster-based 
approach based on identifying patients 
and any persons with whom this pa-
tient has come into contact. However, 
as of 4 April, over 40 per cent of cases 
could no longer be traced. The opaque 
origin of a large number of new cases 
has led to a clear switch to risk mitiga-
tion strategies in Japan’s national re-
sponse.  
 
In accordance with the revised Act on 
Special Measures for Pandemic Influ-
enza and New Infectious Diseases Pre-
paredness and Response, a state of 
emergency was declared for large parts 
of the country from 7 April to 6 May. 
The declaration allows prefectural gov-
ernors to close public facilities and re-
quest businesses where people gather 
to temporarily suspend operations. The 
government has also requested busi-
ness operators to switch to teleworking 
unless they provide essential services 
and to restrict access to facilities where 
people gather to reduce personal con-
tact. An initial lack of financial support 
for those affected has impeded grass-
roots cooperation, and constitutional 
restrictions form an impediment to lim-
iting movement in the form of a lock-
down. Moreover, there is no national 
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government is forced to rely on prefec-
tural governors. Accordingly, the re-
sponse among different regions has 
been varied. 
 
The government is focusing on creating 
awareness of the ‘three C’s’: avoid 1) 
closed spaces, 2) crowded places, and 3) 
close-contact settings; and of the need 
for hand washing and avoiding face 
contact. In addition, the incumbent ad-
ministration will provide two washable 
cotton masks to each household in a bid 
to reduce risk of spreading. In order to 
promote closures and to limit the eco-
nomic impact, 100,000 yen (860 EUR) 
will be provided to each resident. How-
ever, due to initial delays in establish-
ing policy for financial compensation, 
businesses have stayed open for ex-
tended periods despite the growing in-
fection rates, and public support has 
been diminishing steadily in the face of 
a flailing government. 
 
In order to gather information on the 
spread of the virus and the level of pub-
lic cooperation, the Ministry of Health, 
Labour and Welfare (MHLW) has used 
LINE, a text-based social media appli-
cation similar to WhatsApp, to send out 
nation-wide surveys. With an 87 per 
cent smartphone user rate and an 82.3 
per cent total penetration rate in Japan, 
LINE is the most widely used online 
application in the country. 24.5 million 
Japanese residents responded to the in-
itial survey, a total of 19.05 per cent of 
the population. Although using a pri-
vate company to collect personal infor-
mation requires flexibility in the pro-
cessing of data, LINE’s high user rate 
has the advantage of allowing the sur-
vey to reach a wide audience. The sur-
vey does not contain information about 
the use of the provided information 
other than that the data is collected for 
the MHLW. The results of the initial 
survey were published online, with the 
main conclusion that current efforts 
need to be strengthened and personal 
contact needs to decrease by at least 70-
80 per cent. 
 
Data on individual patients is collected 
through medical institutions and local 
governments. This data is sorted differ-
ently on the MHLW and individual 
prefectures’ websites, with significant 
variation in the information that is 
made public. The MHLW’s national 
data includes, a concise timeline of 
symptoms and test result, age range (in 
10-year segments), sex, nationality, and 
prefecture and city. In contrast, in 
Osaka Prefecture, case information in-
cludes case number, age range (in 10-
year segments), sex, date of test, prefec-
ture and city, household structure, oc-
cupation, symptoms and an indication 
of severity, and current working situa-
tion. Identifiable personal information, 
such as precise location data and ad-
dress, are excluded in all data sets. All 
official information is published in the 
form of total numbers or lists of new 
cases, available as links to pdf files on 
official websites. This is not user-
friendly, and commercial enterprises, 
the media, and grassroots initiatives 
have had to fill the gap of providing ac-
cessible information to the public 
through open access media coverage 
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While the high response rate of the na-
tional survey suggests high levels of co-
operation with the government’s risk 
mitigation strategies, cooperation has 
nevertheless moved forward piece-
meal. Many companies still require em-
ployees to come to the office as remote 
working has failed to take hold at levels 
necessary for containment. In addition, 
the two-mask policy has been highly 
criticised as unscientific, ineffective, 
and unnecessarily expensive. There are 
increasing reports of refusals to test 
possible infections, a collapsing health 
care infrastructure, shortages of masks 
and protective gear, and inaccessible 
phone numbers for medical consults. 
Because of the state’s failure to ade-
quately respond to the pandemic, con-
taining the spread will have to rely on 
the population’s willingness to either 
endure longer shutdowns or endure 
high infection rates. Travel restrictions 
will have to stay in place, also affecting 
Japan’s major tourism industries. In ei-
ther case, public trust has eroded, eco-
nomic consequences are severe, and the 
health care sector will remain critically 

















In February 2020, the Chinese govern-
ment started working together with 
Chinese technological giants Alibaba 
and Tencent to develop apps that could 
be used in the fight against the COVID-
19 epidemic. After introducing initial 
apps, collectively referred to as “health 
code” apps, in early February, many 
provincial governments followed suit 
and unveiled their own software. 
“Health code” applications work inde-
pendently or as mini programs embed-
ded into other popular apps (WeChat, 
Alipay). 
 
New users are required to answer ques-
tions pertaining to their recent travel 
history, body temperature, contact with 
infected persons, as well as personal in-
formation such as name, ID number, 
and phone number. Some apps (Bei-
jing) require an ID scans, while others 
(Shanghai) require photos. 
 
The user is assigned a QR code of vary-
ing colours: green (safe), yellow (re-
quires 7-day isolation), or red (requires 
14-day isolation). Whenever an app 
user enters publicly-used establish-
ments, they go through a checkpoint, 
first scanning their QR code to prove 
their identity and their status as “safe”, 
then going through temperature 
screening. In case of fever, the QR code 
changes colour to either yellow or red. 
“Health code” apps use governmental 
data, location-based information, travel 
routes of infected people and other 
means to assess whether a person was 
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code changes colour to yellow or red 
depending on those factors. However, 
provincial governments and compa-
nies involved in creating those apps are 
not transparent and do not disclose 
which data is used specifically to assess 
the risk, or how personal data are gath-
ered, stored, or used. 
 
There is no single unified system across 
China yet, although there are plans to 
unify scattered and incompatible pro-
grams used by different cities and 
provinces within one application. Lack 
of a homogenous system, and of inter-
app QR code recognition, impedes 
travel and is one of the main points of 
criticism. Unreliability, lack of infor-
mation, lack of case-to-case solutions, 
and possible data breaches are other is-
sues. Nevertheless, overall, the intro-
duction of “health code” apps was wel-
come by the citizens. The Chinese gov-
ernment responded to some domestic 
criticism, apparently in a fashion that 
convinced the public at large. 
 
The New York Times reported that 
Hangzhou’s “health code” app con-
tained a tracking program, allowing the 
user’s location to be sent to law enforce-
ment agencies. The Chinese govern-
ment has not responded to those allega-
tions. Law enforcement authorities 
were also involved in developing said 
app. 
 
Drawing on previous experience when 
China expanded its surveillance system 
due to major events (2008 Beijing 
Olympics, Expo 2010), “health code” 




The Singaporean government started 
taking precautionary measures in re-
sponse to COVID-19 relatively early, at 
the beginning of January. The first case 
in Singapore was confirmed on January 
23rd. On March 20th, the government 
launched TraceTogether, one of the 
first apps developed to counter 
COVID-19. On that day, Singapore had 
only 385 confirmed cases and zero 
deaths. The government had not imple-
mented a lockdown, although social 
distancing measures were in place. 
Around that time, the approach of the 
Singaporean government was interna-
tionally regarded as exemplary. At the 
end of March, about 1 million (1 in 6) 
Singaporeans had downloaded the 
app.  
 
In April, however, the situation in the 
city-state has worsened, and the gov-
ernment implemented a lockdown on 
April 7th after all. April 20th saw a rec-
ord 22% (1,426 persons) increase in con-
firmed cases to a total of 8,014. Of the 
newly confirmed cases, 1,369 are per-
mit holders residing in dormitories, a 
group which is currently more exten-
sively tested than before. All confirmed 
cases in Singapore are hospitalised, as 
has been the approach from the start; 23 
patients are in intensive care. In total, 
59,737 persons had been tested by April 
14th. 
 
TraceTogether works as follows. Indi-
viduals can choose to download the 
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bile phone number. The app then at-
taches a randomly generated ID to this 
number. Via Bluetooth, the app detects 
the random IDs of other nearby users 
and records these. If a user tests posi-
tively for COVID-19, he or she can 
choose to share the app’s logs with the 
Ministry of Health, who will encrypt 
the IDs of other users found in these 
logs. This opens up the phone numbers 
of the infectee’s ‘close contacts’ (users 
who have been within 2 meters for at 
least 30 minutes), who will receive a 
message that they are at high risk of in-
fection, so that they can take steps to 
prevent further spreading. The app 
supplements manual contact tracing ef-
forts and is not the only technology re-
lied upon to fight COVID-19, as Singa-
poreans also receive government up-
dates via WatsApp, while quarantined 
citizens are being monitored via video 
calls and have to share their phone lo-
cations with officials.  
 
The Singaporean government has 
stated that it is committed to safeguard-
ing the privacy of TraceTogether’s us-
ers, emphasising that using the app is 
voluntary. Furthermore, the data, 
which is stored securely on non-public 
servers, only include the user’s phone 
number and random ID. No personal 
or location data are collected. The data 
will be deleted if a user chooses to re-
voke consent. The app solely stores the 
random IDs of other users, which only 
the Ministry of Health can decrypt. The 
personal identity of users will not be re-
vealed on the phones of other users. 
Third parties are unable to track the 
identity of a user, since the random ID 
is refreshed at regular intervals. Finally, 
the collected data is solely used for trac-
ing persons who might be exposed to 
COVID-19. If contact tracing ends, us-
ers will be prompted to disable the 
functionality of the app. If they do so, 
the connection data will be lost. Users 
could be requested to reinstall or enable 
permissions in case of a future out-
break.  
 
On April 10, about one in five Singapo-
reans had downloaded TraceTogether, 
while authorities stated that 75% of the 
population should use the app for it to 
be effective. What could explain this 
low number is that only 41% of Singa-
poreans feel comfortable sharing a pos-
itive COVID-19 test result via this tech-
nology. Furthermore, the app has re-
ceived negative reviews because of 
technical issues. Apart from problems 
deriving from a low adoption rate, a di-
rector of TraceTogether has warned 
against over-reliance on contact tracing 
apps and stated that these should not 
replace manual contact tracing efforts, 
which can take into account more fac-
tors in the process and increase accu-
racy.  
 
Governments and developers from 
around the world, including from the 
Netherlands, have shown interest in 
TraceTogether, partly because the app 
allows for relatively little privacy intru-
sion compared to other tracing apps, 
although privacy concerns still remain. 
The app’s code has been made open 
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South Korea’s success in containing the 
spread of COVID-19 is due to its inte-
gration of big data with user-friendly 
applications, enforcement of quaran-
tine guidelines, and regulations in 
terms of data sharing capabilities. The 
country will be among the first in the 
world to have an efficient long-term 
strategy for containing pandemics. 
However, the use of personal infor-
mation in tracking patients, and flexible 
regulations with regard to data-sharing 
is expected to permanently affect indi-
vidual privacy. 
 
The main points and impacts discussed 
below are as follows: 
 
 User-friendly and mandatory 
app usage, combined with en-
forced quarantine guidelines 
and quick information-gather-
ing mechanisms have enabled a 
comprehensive approach to con-
taining COVID-19. 
 Flexibility in policymaking and 
the utilization of remote medi-
care has effectively decreased 
the burden on healthcare infra-
structure. 
 National lockdowns and large-
scale restrictions of movement 
are unnecessary with successful 
containment strategies, limiting 
the negative economic impact of 
the pandemic. 
 There are permanent impacts on 
the use of personal information 
and privacy, and the possibility 
of future pandemics ensure that 
information gathering mecha-
nisms will remain in place. 
 
Several apps in both the public and pri-
vate sectors have been developed in 
South Korea with the purpose of con-
taining the spread of COVID-19, in ad-
dition to national and local emergency 
systems that notify anyone in a certain 
radius of possible risks.  
 
The government of South Korea has de-
veloped two apps available for public 
use, the “self-diagnosis app” and the 
“self-quarantine safety app”. The “self-
diagnosis app” can be downloaded on 
arrival into South Korea and is required 
for both foreigners and Korean nation-
als to pass through immigration. Users 
have to enter their “passport infor-
mation, nationality, name, address, and 
other necessary information for quar-
antine” into the system. Refusal to co-
operate will result in a denial to enter 
the country. 
 
Users are required to report possible 
symptoms once a day during the man-
datory 14-day quarantine on arrival. 
The data is collected through the Korea 
Centers for Disease Control and Pre-
vention (KCDC) and shared with local 
governments and public health clinics 
if the user shows symptoms for more 
than 2 consecutive days. Local govern-
ments are then prompted to have users 
tested. In order to assure users keep re-
porting, notifications are sent out 
whenever a user fails to do so. They are 
subsequently contacted via phone. If 
the user refuses to use the application, 
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The app is user-friendly and accessible, 
and reporting symptoms is done 
through four yes or no questions asking 
the user if they have 1) a cough, 2) a fe-
ver, 3) a sore throat, or 4) difficulty 
breathing (dyspnea). This can be done 
in four languages (Korean, English, 
Chinese, and Japanese) on either an iOS 
or Android system. The app also pro-
vides information on nearby testing 
clinics. Testing facilities are widely 
available, making the process easy to 
understand and complete. 
 
The “self-quarantine safety app” is 
available in the same languages and op-
erating systems. The main fea-
ture/function of this app is to monitor 
symptoms and provide a tool for self-
diagnosis. In addition, an alarm is set to 
go off once the user leaves the desig-
nated self-quarantine area. Everyone 
coming from outside of South Korea is 
obligated to download the app, includ-
ing Korean nationals. According to the 
South Korean government, around 91.4 
per cent of people in self-quarantine 
have installed the app, although the au-
thorities do not clarify how this rate is 
calculated. The government states that: 
“The application largely has 3 key func-
tions: a self-diagnosis for the users to 
conduct and submit the results with the 
assigned government officers; a GPS-
based location tracking to prevent pos-
sible violation of self-quarantine or-
ders; and providing necessary infor-
mation including self-quarantine 
guidelines and the contact info of the 
assigned government case officers.” Of-
ficials are tasked with checking the data 
received through the app and follow-
ing up on possible non-response or vi-
olations of self-quarantine guidelines 
by tracking the movements of the pa-
tient using GPS. 
 
Both systems are designed to control 
large populations of possibly infected 
users, and they require the collection 
and processing of big data, on top of 
vast human resources for enforcement. 
Ultimately, these apps function to re-
duce the risk of spreading the virus and 
govern the movement of (possibly) in-
fected people using surveillance tech-
nology. 
 
In the private sector, several apps have 
been released that utilise publicly avail-
able data published by the KCDC. For 
example, the “Now and Here app” de-
termines the possible risks of a planned 
route using recorded movement data of 
confirmed COVID-19 patients. It also 
provides the locations of testing facili-
ties. The “Cobaek app” tracks the move-
ment of users and alerts them when 
they are within 100 meters of a con-
firmed patient, also listing the availabil-
ity of masks at pharmacies based on 
public data provided by the National 
Information Society Agency (NIA). 
 
Laws on data use have been revised in 
order to facilitate such broad use. 
Through the Infectious Disease Control 
and Prevention Act (IDPA) and the in-
troduction of the Advancement of 
Smart Quarantine Information System, 
the state has made it possible to track 
individuals coming in from overseas, 
tracking their movements through ship 
or flight number, place of departure 
and destination, arrival time and per-
sonal passenger information, GPS data, 
card transactions, and CCTV record-
ings. Under the IDPA, any institution, 
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organization, or individual must share 
information on anyone who is infected 
or deemed “likely to be infected by an 
infectious disease.” The KCDC shares 
information with the “National Police 
Agency, Credit Finance Association of 
Korea, 3 telecommunications compa-
nies and 22 credit card companies” for 
the purpose of tracking possible pa-
tients and to “quickly identify transmis-
sion routes and places”. This includes 
current whereabouts and the total time 
spent in each location. Information col-
lection is automated and can be done in 
10 minutes from the moment a request 
is made. The use of big data thus ex-
tends beyond healthcare and far into 
the lives of private individuals.   
 
Within the healthcare sector, the gov-
ernment has made temporary arrange-
ments for allowing doctors and nurses 
to consult with patients through video 
calls and video conferencing, telemedi-
cine, or “remote medicare”. This is done 
to decrease the burden on hospital staff, 
and to provide technical knowledge be-
tween healthcare facilities. The app 
“Medihere” allows users to contact hos-
pitals and make an appointment online. 
“Odoctor” gives patients the option to 
access general medical information and 
diagnosis, and it allows them to partic-
ipate in remote treatment through the 
“Coronavirus 119” function. This app is 
also designed to screen patients before 
they visit clinics and hospitals, and to 
shorten the amount of time spent there, 
reducing possibility of transmission. In 
order to make use of these apps, pa-
tients are required to answer questions 
concerning their medical history. This 
information is shared with care provid-
ers.  
Public and private apps have been 
widely used, with millions of down-
loads in South Korea. Combined with 
the emergency system from which re-
ceivers cannot opt out, South Korean 
residents are able to access critical in-
formation and avoid high-risk areas. 
There are signs of fatigue among resi-
dents from continuous notifications. 
However, the use of technology and in-
formation-sharing in South Korea has 
been highly effective in delaying the 
spread of COVID-19. As a result, the 
country has avoided severe lockdowns 
and restrictions of movement on a na-
tional scale. Economic impact has been 
limited by the swift response, and 
healthcare infrastructure remains intact 
and able to cope with current levels of 
infections. 
 
In return, South Koreans and foreign 
visitors have been subject to invasive 
changes in terms of privacy protection, 
with the government  able to access 
personal information if there are suspi-
cions of a possible infection. South Ko-
rea has faced multiple pandemics in the 
past, and these experiences inform a 
policy approach in which recent 
changes could be made permanent, in 
anticipation of possible new pandem-
ics. Although the government has 
stated it will remove any personal in-
formation after the pandemic is over, a 
clear line delineating the end of the 
pandemic has not been established. The 
measures allowing for the described re-
sponse have become embedded in pol-
icy and law, meaning that these mecha-
nisms can be started up quickly when-
ever a new pandemic arises. Moreover, 
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the government has stated it will pur-
sue further investments in enhancing 
and innovating the current systems, en-
shrining current strategies as a bench-









































Taiwan has been relatively successful 
in its fight against COVID-19, and there 
is no signs of domestic transmission so 
far. As a result, the most import 
measures to contain COVID-19 cur-
rently is still to effectively quarantine 
those who travel from outside of Tai-
wan. The Taiwanese government uses 
a system called ‘digital fence’ to help 
enforce the quarantine, as it monitors if 
the people under quarantine stay at 
their quarantine address; to this end, 
the app uses the location data gener-
ated by cellular signals every ten 
minutes. 
 
To address privacy concerns, the ‘digi-
tal fence’ takes several measures. First, 
it uses cellular signals instead of GPS 
signals, which are able to generate 
more accurate location data to locate 
people under quarantine. According to 
the Taiwanese government, this in-
fringes privacy to a lesser degree. Sec-
ond, the app uses location data exclu-
sively for the purpose of the quaran-
tine, and people under quarantine will 
not be monitored anymore after the 14-
days quarantine period. However, the 
location data will be stored until the 
end of the ongoing crisis. Third, the lo-
cation data is not actually shared with 
the government, since it is the five ma-
jor telecommunication companies in 
Taiwan that do the monitoring, and 
they only report to the local govern-
ment authorities in case there are indi-
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However, the ‘digital fence’ system also 
reported several common problems 
and has been challenged by civil soci-
ety. First, the app created false alarms 
and serious annoyance for people un-
der quarantine, due to various tech-
nical issues, such as telephones running 
out of battery, bad network connec-
tions, or simple failures to answer 
phone calls. Second, as MP Wu I-ding 
pointed out in her parliamentary in-
quiry, the government’s Home Quaran-
tine Notice fails to properly inform 
those who undergo quarantine that 
they will be monitored. 
 
Furthermore, the Taiwanese govern-
ment, in cooperation with the Taiwan 
AI Lab, has developed a contact-moni-
toring smartphone application for pos-
sible future scenarios. The usage of this 
application will be voluntary, and the 
personal data of the users will be anon-
ymised and will only be stored locally 
on the user’s smartphone. Also, as Tai-
wan’s digital minister explained, there 
will be no need for this app unless there 
are signs of domestic transmission in 
Taiwan. Finally, Taiwan’s digital minis-
ter has rolled out a well-received 
‘eMask’ app that tracks and displays 
the inventories of local drugstores, to 
prevent shortages, panic buying, and 




































The work presented here is based on a first round of desk-research, and it omits detailed ref-
erences in the interest of brevity. More detailed and fully-sourced studies will follow: in late 
April, the LAC will publish the full regional surveys on its website; at a later stage, it will 
publish an in-depth report that will incorporate detailed policy analyses. All of these outputs 
are written in English, reflecting the international backgrounds of our contributors. 
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